hurriyat needs to get real

The meeting called by the Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, to discuss Kashmir with the separatist elements looks to be a non starter. The Huriyat conference has decided that it will not participate in the meeting. This is a setback for those who think that the situation in Kashmir has changed enough for at least a dialogue to commence. Neither the hardliners, backed by Gillani, nor the moderates under the Mirwaiz, have come forward for the proposed talks.
The Prime Minister had offered a broad range within which talks could take place. These included discussion on some form of self governance for the state. Earlier they were allowed to travel to Pakistan to meet with that country’s leadership and make the atmosphere more amiable. By flatly refusing even to come forward for a dialogue the separatists are simply being obstinate.

In their zeal to exclude themselves from the political process, the Huriyat has come to be seen as a part of the problem rather than a solution to the Kashmir issue. For one thing, they are not the elected representatives. For another, they have not come out with any politically realistic proposal of their own for India to consider.
For the separatist not participating in talks this be bad strategy. They risk irrelevance and may be overplaying their hand. There is a change in the mood, as far as Kashmir is concerned. India has much more self assurance in dealing with the Kashmir issue - and this has given the leadership a greater room for maneuver in policy making. While terror attacks continue, some of them on prestige targets, the army has clearly an upper handover the terrorists in the valley. There is an elected government in place with a mandate to improve governance. This government is doing decent better job of managing the state. With tourists returning, the economic situation has not been better in the valley for over two decades.
In the aftermath of the earthquake India did a far better job of providing relief. By contrast, in occupied Kashmir the relief operations were tardy at best. There is some goodwill on the ground for the government today in the valley.
The separatists need to come up with a credible roadmap and demonstrated willingness to negotiate. There time may well be running out as peace returns and the economy picks up. Kashmiris have a stake in peace, to uphold peace and make it permanent, the least the Huriyat can do is to start talking.

IAF the widow makers

There could not have been a more tragic irony. In mid-1999 at the height of the Kargil conflict Flying Officer Pankaj Joshi and Flight Lieutenant Gaurav Chibber, were both in their early 20s. They had flown almost 30 sorties. But six months later both of them are dead - victims of peace-time air crashes that has seen the Indian Air Force's (IAF) flight record plummet to worrying depths.
Chibber died soon after the Kargil war on August 6, 1999, when his MiG-29 on a routine sortie over Himachal Pradesh suddenly developed problems and crashed into the pine forests. Joshi died on December 12 near Chandigarh, when his MiG-21 inexplicably burst into flames and went out of control. Joshi did try to save himself by ejecting from the cockpit but for some reason his parachute never opened and he dropped like a stone to his death.
Joshi and Chibber joined the long list of 28 IAF pilots who died in peace-time crashes in 1999 - the highest so far in the decade. The new year brought no respite. On January 10, a MiG-27 on a routine flight from the Jodhpur air base suddenly nosedived and smashed into the desert sands like a dart on a cardboard target.
The IAF's track record in the past decade is dismal by any standards: In the '90s, according to its own submissions in Parliament, it lost 80 pilots and 185 aircraft. Which makes it almost a squadron a year or a fourth of its entire fleet in the past decade alone. And the estimated loss: Rs 6,800 crore.
What is worrying is that much of the loss has happened in the past five years. "There is no doubt that after stabilising in the mid-'90s the crash rate - especially vis-a-vis the old MiG-21s - has gone up dramatically in 1999," says Air Vice-Marshal (retd) Kapil Kak of the Delhi-based Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA). A senior IAF pilot instructor says, "Whatever the establishment may maintain, such crashes send the morale of the force plummeting."
The IAF in its defence says one reason for the high crash rate is that compared to previous years the force is flying at least 20 per cent more sorties in peace time because of the tense security atmosphere. A senior operations officer maintains that Combat Air Patrol Sorties or caps has gone up in forward air bases such as Jodhpur, Ambala, Tezpur and Adampur. Officials also point out that the rate of crash has remained a steady three per 10,000 hours of flying for the past decade. The IAF considers this as a normal attrition rate. But senior officers acknowledge that the rising number of crashes are cause for concern.
Much of the problem relates to the ageing MiG-21 which accounts for 62 per cent of the crashes. The aircraft, which this year completes 39 years with the IAF and still remains its backbone, is beset with problems. All the 22 MiG-21 squadrons are at least two-decades old. A third of the fleet is believed to be grounded for the lack of confidence in their ability to keep airborne without a glitch. The IAF loses one MiG fighter every 2,500 flight hours, making it one of the most vulnerable machines in service with any force in the world.
Most MiG-21s crash because of engine burnouts immediately after take-off and stress fractures to the airframe. The burnouts are often a result of poor engine maintenance and inadequate supply of spare parts especially of the critical blades of the engine that provide the thrust. But as a senior officer commanding MiG-21 squadrons points out, "Since nearly 22 of the IAF's 35 squadrons comprise of the MiG-21s, it is bound to reflect in the accident rate as well. Do not forget that as many as 17 Jaguars have crashed and we have only four Jaguar squadrons in the air force."
Part of the blame for the high rate of crashes lies with the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and the IAF. They did not act fast enough to induct the planned MiG-21 upgrade which was expected to enter service after a comprehensive refit in 1999. The refit has now been delayed by at least three years -- first, because the government could not decide the contract between Israel and Russia; and secondly, owing to lethargy on the part of the Russians. Instead of upgrading the entire MiG-21 Bis fleet, all that has been achieved so far is flight-testing of two MiG-21s in Russia.
Ageing MiGs are only one aspect of the problem. "There are two reasons for the IAF's poor air safety record," says Air Commodore (retd) Jasjit Singh, director IDSA. "The first is a 16-year delay in procurement of the Advance Jet Trainer (AJT). The second is the consistently poor quality of spare parts that are needed to keep the fighter planes airworthy." With the AJT absent, Indian fighter pilots do not get sufficient training to equip them to move from basic aircraft, such as the Kiran Mark II, to the most advanced ones like the Mirage 2000.
The IAF depends on the oldest version of the MiG-21 -- the MiG-21 FL -- for training but found the craft unsuitable because it is essentially a fighter-interceptor and does not incorporate any features of a trainer jet. Analysts say that bad training results in fatal errors of judgement at high speeds and these often lead to crashes. Says former air chief S.K. Kaul, "The government's lack of action on the AJT is nothing short of crass disregard for the force's vital needs." Even the present chief, Air Chief Marshal A.Y. Tipnis, at a commanders' conference in June 1999 blamed poor training for the high number of air crashes.
A decision on the AJT though may at last be on hand. A French team visited Delhi last week and an English one is expected over the next two weeks to hammer out a deal. Even when the AJT is acquired indications are that India may go in for only 60 such aircraft. Air forces with comparable force structures, such as the UK and France, have opted for 150 aircraft, including about one squadron in reserve. So the problem of lack of training may persist.
Another major cause for the alarmingly high rate of IAF accidents is the lack of spare parts. In the mid '90s, a committee appointed to look into the air crashes pointed out this problem and pinned part of the blame on the spares made by the public-sector Hindustan Aeronautics Limited. As for the spares from Russia, sources say that though they are now supplied on time, the costs since 1991 have skyrocketed, in some instances by as much as 400 per cent. Given the fact that 70 per cent of Indian fighters are of Russian origin this has a negative impact on procurement of crucial components.
Each of the major reasons for the increasing number of crashes - poor training, ageing fleet, pilot error, defective spare parts - are problems that can be addressed if the IAF and the mod get down to brasstacks quickly. Otherwise, most of the fighters would have to be nicknamed "widow makers".