Indian Navy sails into the future

The new Chief of Naval Staff Admiral D. K. Joshi takes command at a time of extraordinary expansion for the Indian Navy. He has also gone on to say that the Indian Navy — the fifth largest in the world — is ready to protect the country’s economic interests in the South China Sea, particularly the oil blocks off the coast of Vietnam being explored by ONGC. The Indian Army and the Indian Air force are accustomed to fast growth, but the Navy, after a brief spurt in the mid-80s, suddenly came to a halt. It, however, appears to be back in full steam mode. However, the Navy’s place within strategic thinking in India, a country with a predominantly landlocked mindset, is uncertain. The Royal navy legacy According to the Defence Ministry, the Navy has added as many as fifteen ships over the last three years. This includes a leased nuclear submarine from Russia, the Akulla II class. It will soon take delivery of the much-delayed Russian aircraft carrier retrofitted for Indian use, the INS Vikramaditya. Other ships include three “stealth” frigates of the Shivalik class, resupply tankers and fast attack boats. The plan is to add five more ships every year for the next five years. The Navy has received a major boost in its surveillance capability with the acquisition of the US-made P8i aircraft, armed with Harpoon missiles. These aircraft will replace an aging fleet of Tu142 and IL38 aircraft of the 80s. The aircraft carrier group and the nuclear submarine are capabilities, that could, over time, restore Indian maritime primacy in the Indian Ocean waters. The imperial Navy that India inherited from the British controlled seas from Aden to Singapore. That sea control included an outreach capability over the three critical “chokepoints”— Bandar Abbas in the Persian Gulf, the straits south of Sri Lanka and the Malacca straits in the Singapore littoral. More bases Besides these impressive strides in hardware, the Indian Navy has also developed two critical bases, at an estimated cost of $3 billion. On the Western Seaboard, the INS Dweeprakshak on the Lakshadweep Island will handle surveillance and base larger war ships. With this base, India has will acquire a robust sea control capability. On the Eastern Sea Board similarly, India has opened a new base, the naval air station, Baaz. This base will be under the tri-command in the Campbell bay, Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Significantly, it is nearer to the Malacca strait than to India. The two bases are complemented by India’s longest runway at the INS Rajali in Tamil Nadu that will base the P81 spy aircraft. The Navy has also gone digital with all ships in the process of being linked to a command and control apparatus. Strategic Centrestage With its ability to remain underwater without refuelling for long periods, the nuclear submarine is the ‘Alpha’ asset. It is virtually impossible to detect and can have several nuclear weapons aboard depending on the configuration. What is more, the nuclear submarine can be far, really far, out at sea. The Navy is unique in its ability to project power beyond the constraints of national boundaries. After twelve nautical miles, the world is your oyster. Neither the Army nor the Air Force enjoy a similar advantage. For India, the submarine combined with the aircraft carrier battle group provides a critical edge. It is a pity that the Indian mindset is landlocked. The strategic planners need a complete reorientation from brown and white lands of Rajasthan and the Himalayas to the endless oceans. The Navy, to be truly a strategic force, will require two critical changes in India’s way of war. First, India will have to move away from prioritising the million-plus army and allocate bandwidth and funds for the Navy in strategy. Time overruns Second, the Defence Ministry and the Navy with the myriad defence public sector undertakings that they control, need to get their act together. Although Indian-made warships cost a quarter of similar class ships in the West and Japan, the time overruns are very high. The Navy has a staggering delayed delivery schedule. This constrains the force with only about six submarines at any given point at sea. The Indian Navy needs robust oversight and a bold decision — allowing private players in warship building. Some of this is already happening. The hull of Arihant, India’s own nuclear submarine due for sea trials this year, was built by L&T, a private firm. Such participation can accelerate if India allows majority investment by foreign players in shipbuilding and taps the potential of defence offsets. Partnership is the way forward. India’s state-owned shipyards are in a growth dilemma — choked with orders they cannot fulfil for lack of technology and funds. The ocean is too large to be anybody’s playground. Technology, with cruise missiles and potential anti-aircraft carrier missile defence, has shrunk geography. India shares with democratic countries the maritime advantage — all of them have robust navies. Working with the democracies of the US, Japan, Indonesia, Singapore and Australia will be to its advantage. This will need diplomatic innovation and a strategic re-jig. Without it, floating assets, even hefty ones, will count for little. Lastly, the Defence Ministry will need to control leaks on its mother ship. With a nuclear submarine, potentially armed with nuclear weapons out at sea, another such leak could lead to an unthinkable catastrophe. Securing ships is the vital challenge for the Indian Navy in the years ahead.

Armageddon Parlaya kayamat Nuclear weapons in Pakistan

The command and control of nuclear weapons in the Islamic State of Pakistan are of great concern for the outside world. The news on the ground is bad and it is getting worse. Pakistan has one of the five largest nuclear arsenals in the world. According to last year’s Global Fissile Material Report, it is thought to have 90 to 110 nuclear warheads. But the security of the nuclear weapons is not the sole concern. The very fabric of the State itself is mutating towards Islamic extremism. With every passing day, the danger of nuclear weapons, fissile material and even scientists finding their way to terror groups increases. Pakistan’s polity — where radical Islam is creeping into everyday life — is now riddled with frequent attacks on sites that are thought to store the country’s nuclear weapons. These combine to produce a perilous instability. Even more dangerously, the Pakistani military establishment may have elements within itself that are allied with the Taliban. In such a scenario, an attack of the kind on the Minhas airbase in Kamra could become frighteningly successful. That attack was not the first. Earlier in 2011, an assault was mounted on another facility at the largest Pakistan navy base in Karachi, also believed to house nuclear weapons. In 2009, the nerve centre of Pakistan’s army — its general head quarters in Rawalpindi — came under attack. It is as if terror groups can pick and choose their targets at will in Pakistan. None of these assaults was a small-time attempt. They were commando operations with rocket launchers and machine guns. Tellingly, they took out at least as many soldiers as terrorists. Pakistan has refused to sign the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. With its new nuclear reactor at Khushab, Pakistan will add more nuclear bombs to its already massive nuclear arsenal. The terror architecture has robust foundations in the Islamic republic. Pakistan is the laboratory of terror groups that have probably been nurtured by the State over the last four decades. Some of these terror groups have now turned on the State. They demand the formation of a puritan regime in Pakistan with sharia law. This is not a political demand. These are radical extremists armed to the teeth, and having a mass base amongst the population. But the looming threat has not stopped Pakistan from continuing to nurture terror groups. The Pakistani army and its ‘secret service’, the Inter-Services Intelligence, still see profit in the terror option. The fact that Osama bin Laden was just outside Pakistan’s most important military training establishment in Abbotabad underlined this dramatically. Pakistan is hooked to the low cost-high returns proxy wars, which are against America. In many countries, democracy mitigates extremism. In Pakistan, however, the exact opposite is at play. The party widely tipped as the next winner in Pakistan’s elections is lead by the cricketer-turned-politician, Imran Khan. It is believed to be very close to the current army leadership. The party has General Hamid Gul in a mentor’s role. Gul was the chief of the ISI who fast-tracked extremist militia groupings as a proxy war tactic for Pakistan. Should Khan’s party make it in the general elections, the possibility of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorists could come one step closer. Given the possibility — some futurists will say the certainty — of terrorists laying their hands on nuclear material through an attack on one of Pakistan’s nuclear plants, the international community has to seriously consider its options. The options are few and fraught with danger. At a minimum, Pakistan must be a party to the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. Diplomatic efforts round the world need to stress the removal of the opacity from the Pakistani nuclear stance. Any new reactors must come under this regime. The other option which occasionally crops up — of America or Israel ‘taking out’ the nuclear weapons — can be tried but will probably have an unpredictable outcome. Pakistan is playing a dangerous game with unforeseeable circumstances. The more the international community vacillates, the greater the danger. Pakistan insists that the command structure of its nuclear weapons is foolproof — it’s relevant to ask who controls them. Diplomatic efforts must focus on ensuring that the next 9\11 — if it happens — is not under a mushroom cloud.