Banning tourism will kill the tiger

The Supreme Court’s decision banning tourism in core areas of tiger habitats overlooks several critical considerations. It will harm, rather then help, the cause of tiger conservation. For a start, it gives way too much power to the forest department. The ban will mean only one agency will both implement the tiger protection agenda, and audit that process. The various forest and environment officials at the Centre and at the State level have a terrible record of tiger protection. They had held up the absurd number of 5,000 wild tigers in India till recently when it was already clear to every one (including the much maligned lodge owners) that there are only about 1,500 tigers left in India. Tellingly, the two parks from where the tiger completely disappeared due to poaching were Panna and Sariska and both were not in the top ten most visited by tourists. In contrast, parks with the highest tiger density, such as Ranthambhore and Corbett, are amongst the most visited In India. In both Panna and Sariska, the forest officers went to great lengths to deny that the parks were without a single big cat. The unscientific relocation in Sariska has been a double disaster. These are the very people who will run tiger parks across India, if the new order is implemented in its current form. Tourism isn’t the villain Tourism allows for ample outside scrutiny of the forest and thus aids tiger preservation. Tourism brings in its wake assessment by lodge owners, guides, photographers and other stake-holders whose survival depends on robust tiger numbers. Breeding of tigers has been observed with regularity by experts even when the tourism season is in full swing. What is more, no tiger deaths due to tourism have been reported. Forest officer vehicles have, however, caused at least three tiger deaths in national parks of Madhya Pradesh in the recent past. Poaching for skin and bones and poisoning by nearby villagers remain the two main causes of tiger deaths in India. Incidentally a majority of the poaching incidents, including the latest one in Corbett last fortnight, have happened during the monsoon, when Parks are closed to the tourists. The Minister of Environment and Forests has proposed dismantling of tourism infrastructure in and near parks within a five-year framework. Instead, this is the time for the tourism industry as well as the MoEF to draw up a regulatory framework. And hotels that violate norms need to go. Price it for rarity At the same time, India needs to understand that the tiger is the rarest of the rare, and access to it should be priced accordingly. The African model offers some lessons. A one-week visit to the Masai Mara, Kenya, during the great migrations costs $3,000 while a week in Ranthambhore or Corbett costs a measly $400 - and the Masai Mara is far cheaper than reserves in places such as Okavango in Botswana. Raising access fee to national park core area will not only regulate tourist numbers but also provide for far greater revenues for the upkeep of parks and sharing with the local population. This is the one measure that will achieve the desired ends and is also easy to implement on the ground. To deny future generations that heart-stopping moment - when one sights a tiger in the wild - is no solution. The State’s job is to facilitate this majestic experience through a regulatory approach. Each park in India has unique issues and will need different solutions. A thought-out policy framework - not an “off with the tourist's head” diktat - is the way forward.

indian air force in trouble.

Depending on what media you access, the price of the Rafale, the new “bird” of the Indian Air Force (IAF), ranges between $10 billion and $18 billion. Clearly, while the IAF will fly the Rafale, the media is flying kites! However, for the IAF there is plenty of turbulence to deal with. The deal has been delayed, even though it was trumpeted as the fairest in India defence procurement history, thanks to earlier objections raised by Rajya Sabha MP, Mr M.V. Mysura Reddy. It took the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the IAF well over five years to initiate final negotiations. These negotiations will take a further year to close if all goes off well with the inquiry the Defence Minister has ordered. In this one-year period, the cost could rise by at least 25 per cent, combining inflation and the depreciating rupee. Thus, a seemingly fair procedure has come at a very high cost. Meanwhile, Rafale has developed new radar and added some avionics and airframe capabilities. WHAT ABOUT TEJAS? Maintaining its fighter squadron strengths to the minimum mandated level is the biggest challenge for the IAF. Even with the addition of the proposed SU 30s and the Rafaels, the strength of the fleet is unlikely to reach the desirable 42 squadrons that it plans by 2020. The IAF will retire more aircraft (such as the Mig 21s and the Jaguars) over this period than it will induct. Thus, the air force is likely to be short of optimum strength in fighter planes well into the next decade. The lack of squadrons is directly related to war preparedness and results in a domino which includes lesser sorties flown in peacetime, constrained war wastage reserves and a bigger part of the fleet in overhaul and maintenance. Lost in the cacophony surrounding the acquisition of the Rafale is the fate of India’s own light combat aircraft — the Tejas. The aircraft has been under-funded from its inception in 1983 — the actual funding for the programme came almost a decade later in 1992. The Indian defence acquisition strategy is at variance here from that of China, which has focused on indigenous aircraft development since the 60s. The LCA Tejas has, as yet, not got simple clearances, such as an all-weather-capability and lightning strike clearance. The strategic role of this aircraft is in question, although it has world-class avionic capabilities. It is unlikely to be inducted in effective numbers till 2018 or even later. Thus, the IAF has a missing middle — a single-engine new aircraft that can act as the bulwark — even as it gets very expensive twin-engine-heavy Sukhois and Rafales at the top end. INFRASTRUCTURE DEFICIT The IAF does not have a basic trainer aircraft on which to hone the skills of rookie pilots. The IAF is probably the only air force in the world that puts pilots directly on a jet rather then a turboprop basic trainer. Even the jet trainer is of a model from the 1970s. The Hawk aircraft have come a decade too late and the interim has caused loss of precious lives and compromised training. The MoD has belatedly approved the acquisition of the Swiss Pilatus trainer. Even if its procurement procedure goes forward, it will be five years before a fleet can be put in place. This is because acquiring the aircraft is only the beginning. Instructors have to be trained on the new aircraft and the equipment protocols put in place. Till such time, the safety record of the IAF is likely to suffer all the more. The IAF lost 46 fighters in the last six years. Alarmingly, the losses include not just aging MiG 21s, even ultra-modern SU 30s were lost. The IAF does not even have hangar facilities for majority of the SU 30s. This came to light when exposure to foreign elements was believed to be a cause in the last major crash of an SU 30. If basic infrastructure on the ground such as a hangar is unavailable in requisite numbers one can only imagine the state of more advance airworthiness procedures. Some years ago the IAF damaged half a dozen frontline Mirage 2000s in Gwalior when a hangar complex housing them collapsed apparently due to sub-standard construction. No lessons have been learned. The list of woes is endless — from Russian air-to-air missiles, that as a CAG report pointed, under-perform both in range and in accuracy during operations, to the fact that by the IAF’ s own admission there are major gaps in radar coverage across India. It is time that these matters were discussed in Parliament and the public domain, even as the Ministry of Defence mandarins pretend it is business as usual and bask in undeserved glory