Thursday, November 15, 2018

For all the Indo – Pacific talk, India faces deep challenges of grand strategy.





Indo Pacific, the words conjures a world where Indian aircraft carriers assert Mahan’s vision of sea control far from the littoral, even as running silent running deep – an Indian nuclear submarine suddenly pops up to neutralizing a Chinese armada far from their home bases and Indian fighter aircraft undertake sorties from bases in the Indian ocean rim islands - refueled aerially far from the motherland.
As if an Indian role across the world - from the western command in Mumbai down south to Diego Garcia and all the way to the Pacific command in Honolulu is suddenly a reality.
Ever since the United States renamed its command in Hawaii as the Indo - Pacific and President Donald Trump unveiled a new National Security Strategy describing India as a "leading global power" India’s role on the high seas is assumed as manifest destiny.
Not so fast.
While India’s increasing role in global affairs and its attempts at military outreach is a fact – but several factors will likely hold India back.
The biggest block is money; there just isn’t enough of the stuff dedicated to match the ambition of a global role. Sending a few thousand soldiers on UN missions is very different from asserting oneself in the vast Indo - pacific.  What India needs is an expeditionary military force not the continental - largely land based capability that it currently possesses. Transformation will need billions of dollars.  Yet, by spending only 1.65 % of her GDP on defense in 2018, India is bringing a knife to a gunfight.
Pakistan at 3 % and China 3.5 % far outpace her- and the Chinese GDP is nearly five times India’s. The kind of navy with the number of nuclear submarines, mine sweepers and destroyers that India needs for power projection - along with the number of fighter aircraft and mobility for the army that are required - simply cannot be sustained at the current budget levels. A recent report from the ministry of defense said that even acquisitions for which money has been allocated are delayed on an average by three years and in some crucial ones by a decade. This makes some acquisitions obsolete even as they enter service.

One statistic in particular can cut short any indo pacific ambitions, at Rupees 2.5 lakh crore the pension and salary liabilities of India’s defense budget are more than double of the annual 1 lakh crore spending on defense modernization.
The second big concern is grand strategy. Does India really want to be an Indo pacific power? With power will come greater responsibility. So are India’s shoulders broad enough for that? Just as with money so with blood – grand strategy is a hard grind and influence in international relations is a messy business. It calls for taking responsibility – to put it simply it often calls for shedding blood and taking lives – calmly and consistently. Russia did that in Syria, China does it in Tibet and around the world, Mao’s own son died fighting in the Korean war. All great powers do this, this is the very nature of the beast. India is ill suited culturally for asserting hard power.
Take India’s approach with Pakistan an example – one reason why Indian efforts at isolating the Islamic republic fall flat is that no one is convinced that India would not jump at half and opportunity to break bread with Pakistan. We just do not come across as serious players much less as seriously nasty. You cannot lobby the world to isolate Pakistan when you continue to offer the most favored nation to it. Put another way, the world is waiting to see if India is really serious about isolating the Islamic republic for only after that will the Indian scope beyond her neighborhood and in the Indo pacific emerge with some coherence.
India has to demonstrate it can make hard choices in international relations. While it is important not to reduce diplomacy to a zero sum game and retain strategic autonomy - it is equally important to assert when core interests are in question. 

This is especially so in a multi polar world. India’s old relationship with Russia has been reduced from strategic to the transactional. In Afghanistan India has spent $5 billion beefing up a regime that is opening a dialogue with the Taliban.
In short, the world is increasingly shorting India.


It will need - as it always does - a dramatic and sustained change of course through blood, money and application of hard power to bankrupt the short sellers
.
India with its 2.5 trillion dollar economy has choices a plenty but needs to get her hands dirty. The world is waiting with the QUAD option of US Japan and Australia - and beyond, it will not wait for long. 

India must be loved for her soft power and feared for her strength. For otherwise it looks a little silly speaking in a loud voice but carrying a small stick.