Indian Navy sails into the future

The new Chief of Naval Staff Admiral D. K. Joshi takes command at a time of extraordinary expansion for the Indian Navy. He has also gone on to say that the Indian Navy — the fifth largest in the world — is ready to protect the country’s economic interests in the South China Sea, particularly the oil blocks off the coast of Vietnam being explored by ONGC. The Indian Army and the Indian Air force are accustomed to fast growth, but the Navy, after a brief spurt in the mid-80s, suddenly came to a halt. It, however, appears to be back in full steam mode. However, the Navy’s place within strategic thinking in India, a country with a predominantly landlocked mindset, is uncertain. The Royal navy legacy According to the Defence Ministry, the Navy has added as many as fifteen ships over the last three years. This includes a leased nuclear submarine from Russia, the Akulla II class. It will soon take delivery of the much-delayed Russian aircraft carrier retrofitted for Indian use, the INS Vikramaditya. Other ships include three “stealth” frigates of the Shivalik class, resupply tankers and fast attack boats. The plan is to add five more ships every year for the next five years. The Navy has received a major boost in its surveillance capability with the acquisition of the US-made P8i aircraft, armed with Harpoon missiles. These aircraft will replace an aging fleet of Tu142 and IL38 aircraft of the 80s. The aircraft carrier group and the nuclear submarine are capabilities, that could, over time, restore Indian maritime primacy in the Indian Ocean waters. The imperial Navy that India inherited from the British controlled seas from Aden to Singapore. That sea control included an outreach capability over the three critical “chokepoints”— Bandar Abbas in the Persian Gulf, the straits south of Sri Lanka and the Malacca straits in the Singapore littoral. More bases Besides these impressive strides in hardware, the Indian Navy has also developed two critical bases, at an estimated cost of $3 billion. On the Western Seaboard, the INS Dweeprakshak on the Lakshadweep Island will handle surveillance and base larger war ships. With this base, India has will acquire a robust sea control capability. On the Eastern Sea Board similarly, India has opened a new base, the naval air station, Baaz. This base will be under the tri-command in the Campbell bay, Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Significantly, it is nearer to the Malacca strait than to India. The two bases are complemented by India’s longest runway at the INS Rajali in Tamil Nadu that will base the P81 spy aircraft. The Navy has also gone digital with all ships in the process of being linked to a command and control apparatus. Strategic Centrestage With its ability to remain underwater without refuelling for long periods, the nuclear submarine is the ‘Alpha’ asset. It is virtually impossible to detect and can have several nuclear weapons aboard depending on the configuration. What is more, the nuclear submarine can be far, really far, out at sea. The Navy is unique in its ability to project power beyond the constraints of national boundaries. After twelve nautical miles, the world is your oyster. Neither the Army nor the Air Force enjoy a similar advantage. For India, the submarine combined with the aircraft carrier battle group provides a critical edge. It is a pity that the Indian mindset is landlocked. The strategic planners need a complete reorientation from brown and white lands of Rajasthan and the Himalayas to the endless oceans. The Navy, to be truly a strategic force, will require two critical changes in India’s way of war. First, India will have to move away from prioritising the million-plus army and allocate bandwidth and funds for the Navy in strategy. Time overruns Second, the Defence Ministry and the Navy with the myriad defence public sector undertakings that they control, need to get their act together. Although Indian-made warships cost a quarter of similar class ships in the West and Japan, the time overruns are very high. The Navy has a staggering delayed delivery schedule. This constrains the force with only about six submarines at any given point at sea. The Indian Navy needs robust oversight and a bold decision — allowing private players in warship building. Some of this is already happening. The hull of Arihant, India’s own nuclear submarine due for sea trials this year, was built by L&T, a private firm. Such participation can accelerate if India allows majority investment by foreign players in shipbuilding and taps the potential of defence offsets. Partnership is the way forward. India’s state-owned shipyards are in a growth dilemma — choked with orders they cannot fulfil for lack of technology and funds. The ocean is too large to be anybody’s playground. Technology, with cruise missiles and potential anti-aircraft carrier missile defence, has shrunk geography. India shares with democratic countries the maritime advantage — all of them have robust navies. Working with the democracies of the US, Japan, Indonesia, Singapore and Australia will be to its advantage. This will need diplomatic innovation and a strategic re-jig. Without it, floating assets, even hefty ones, will count for little. Lastly, the Defence Ministry will need to control leaks on its mother ship. With a nuclear submarine, potentially armed with nuclear weapons out at sea, another such leak could lead to an unthinkable catastrophe. Securing ships is the vital challenge for the Indian Navy in the years ahead.

Armageddon Parlaya kayamat Nuclear weapons in Pakistan

The command and control of nuclear weapons in the Islamic State of Pakistan are of great concern for the outside world. The news on the ground is bad and it is getting worse. Pakistan has one of the five largest nuclear arsenals in the world. According to last year’s Global Fissile Material Report, it is thought to have 90 to 110 nuclear warheads. But the security of the nuclear weapons is not the sole concern. The very fabric of the State itself is mutating towards Islamic extremism. With every passing day, the danger of nuclear weapons, fissile material and even scientists finding their way to terror groups increases. Pakistan’s polity — where radical Islam is creeping into everyday life — is now riddled with frequent attacks on sites that are thought to store the country’s nuclear weapons. These combine to produce a perilous instability. Even more dangerously, the Pakistani military establishment may have elements within itself that are allied with the Taliban. In such a scenario, an attack of the kind on the Minhas airbase in Kamra could become frighteningly successful. That attack was not the first. Earlier in 2011, an assault was mounted on another facility at the largest Pakistan navy base in Karachi, also believed to house nuclear weapons. In 2009, the nerve centre of Pakistan’s army — its general head quarters in Rawalpindi — came under attack. It is as if terror groups can pick and choose their targets at will in Pakistan. None of these assaults was a small-time attempt. They were commando operations with rocket launchers and machine guns. Tellingly, they took out at least as many soldiers as terrorists. Pakistan has refused to sign the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. With its new nuclear reactor at Khushab, Pakistan will add more nuclear bombs to its already massive nuclear arsenal. The terror architecture has robust foundations in the Islamic republic. Pakistan is the laboratory of terror groups that have probably been nurtured by the State over the last four decades. Some of these terror groups have now turned on the State. They demand the formation of a puritan regime in Pakistan with sharia law. This is not a political demand. These are radical extremists armed to the teeth, and having a mass base amongst the population. But the looming threat has not stopped Pakistan from continuing to nurture terror groups. The Pakistani army and its ‘secret service’, the Inter-Services Intelligence, still see profit in the terror option. The fact that Osama bin Laden was just outside Pakistan’s most important military training establishment in Abbotabad underlined this dramatically. Pakistan is hooked to the low cost-high returns proxy wars, which are against America. In many countries, democracy mitigates extremism. In Pakistan, however, the exact opposite is at play. The party widely tipped as the next winner in Pakistan’s elections is lead by the cricketer-turned-politician, Imran Khan. It is believed to be very close to the current army leadership. The party has General Hamid Gul in a mentor’s role. Gul was the chief of the ISI who fast-tracked extremist militia groupings as a proxy war tactic for Pakistan. Should Khan’s party make it in the general elections, the possibility of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorists could come one step closer. Given the possibility — some futurists will say the certainty — of terrorists laying their hands on nuclear material through an attack on one of Pakistan’s nuclear plants, the international community has to seriously consider its options. The options are few and fraught with danger. At a minimum, Pakistan must be a party to the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. Diplomatic efforts round the world need to stress the removal of the opacity from the Pakistani nuclear stance. Any new reactors must come under this regime. The other option which occasionally crops up — of America or Israel ‘taking out’ the nuclear weapons — can be tried but will probably have an unpredictable outcome. Pakistan is playing a dangerous game with unforeseeable circumstances. The more the international community vacillates, the greater the danger. Pakistan insists that the command structure of its nuclear weapons is foolproof — it’s relevant to ask who controls them. Diplomatic efforts must focus on ensuring that the next 9\11 — if it happens — is not under a mushroom cloud.

Banning tourism will kill the tiger

The Supreme Court’s decision banning tourism in core areas of tiger habitats overlooks several critical considerations. It will harm, rather then help, the cause of tiger conservation. For a start, it gives way too much power to the forest department. The ban will mean only one agency will both implement the tiger protection agenda, and audit that process. The various forest and environment officials at the Centre and at the State level have a terrible record of tiger protection. They had held up the absurd number of 5,000 wild tigers in India till recently when it was already clear to every one (including the much maligned lodge owners) that there are only about 1,500 tigers left in India. Tellingly, the two parks from where the tiger completely disappeared due to poaching were Panna and Sariska and both were not in the top ten most visited by tourists. In contrast, parks with the highest tiger density, such as Ranthambhore and Corbett, are amongst the most visited In India. In both Panna and Sariska, the forest officers went to great lengths to deny that the parks were without a single big cat. The unscientific relocation in Sariska has been a double disaster. These are the very people who will run tiger parks across India, if the new order is implemented in its current form. Tourism isn’t the villain Tourism allows for ample outside scrutiny of the forest and thus aids tiger preservation. Tourism brings in its wake assessment by lodge owners, guides, photographers and other stake-holders whose survival depends on robust tiger numbers. Breeding of tigers has been observed with regularity by experts even when the tourism season is in full swing. What is more, no tiger deaths due to tourism have been reported. Forest officer vehicles have, however, caused at least three tiger deaths in national parks of Madhya Pradesh in the recent past. Poaching for skin and bones and poisoning by nearby villagers remain the two main causes of tiger deaths in India. Incidentally a majority of the poaching incidents, including the latest one in Corbett last fortnight, have happened during the monsoon, when Parks are closed to the tourists. The Minister of Environment and Forests has proposed dismantling of tourism infrastructure in and near parks within a five-year framework. Instead, this is the time for the tourism industry as well as the MoEF to draw up a regulatory framework. And hotels that violate norms need to go. Price it for rarity At the same time, India needs to understand that the tiger is the rarest of the rare, and access to it should be priced accordingly. The African model offers some lessons. A one-week visit to the Masai Mara, Kenya, during the great migrations costs $3,000 while a week in Ranthambhore or Corbett costs a measly $400 - and the Masai Mara is far cheaper than reserves in places such as Okavango in Botswana. Raising access fee to national park core area will not only regulate tourist numbers but also provide for far greater revenues for the upkeep of parks and sharing with the local population. This is the one measure that will achieve the desired ends and is also easy to implement on the ground. To deny future generations that heart-stopping moment - when one sights a tiger in the wild - is no solution. The State’s job is to facilitate this majestic experience through a regulatory approach. Each park in India has unique issues and will need different solutions. A thought-out policy framework - not an “off with the tourist's head” diktat - is the way forward.

indian air force in trouble.

Depending on what media you access, the price of the Rafale, the new “bird” of the Indian Air Force (IAF), ranges between $10 billion and $18 billion. Clearly, while the IAF will fly the Rafale, the media is flying kites! However, for the IAF there is plenty of turbulence to deal with. The deal has been delayed, even though it was trumpeted as the fairest in India defence procurement history, thanks to earlier objections raised by Rajya Sabha MP, Mr M.V. Mysura Reddy. It took the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the IAF well over five years to initiate final negotiations. These negotiations will take a further year to close if all goes off well with the inquiry the Defence Minister has ordered. In this one-year period, the cost could rise by at least 25 per cent, combining inflation and the depreciating rupee. Thus, a seemingly fair procedure has come at a very high cost. Meanwhile, Rafale has developed new radar and added some avionics and airframe capabilities. WHAT ABOUT TEJAS? Maintaining its fighter squadron strengths to the minimum mandated level is the biggest challenge for the IAF. Even with the addition of the proposed SU 30s and the Rafaels, the strength of the fleet is unlikely to reach the desirable 42 squadrons that it plans by 2020. The IAF will retire more aircraft (such as the Mig 21s and the Jaguars) over this period than it will induct. Thus, the air force is likely to be short of optimum strength in fighter planes well into the next decade. The lack of squadrons is directly related to war preparedness and results in a domino which includes lesser sorties flown in peacetime, constrained war wastage reserves and a bigger part of the fleet in overhaul and maintenance. Lost in the cacophony surrounding the acquisition of the Rafale is the fate of India’s own light combat aircraft — the Tejas. The aircraft has been under-funded from its inception in 1983 — the actual funding for the programme came almost a decade later in 1992. The Indian defence acquisition strategy is at variance here from that of China, which has focused on indigenous aircraft development since the 60s. The LCA Tejas has, as yet, not got simple clearances, such as an all-weather-capability and lightning strike clearance. The strategic role of this aircraft is in question, although it has world-class avionic capabilities. It is unlikely to be inducted in effective numbers till 2018 or even later. Thus, the IAF has a missing middle — a single-engine new aircraft that can act as the bulwark — even as it gets very expensive twin-engine-heavy Sukhois and Rafales at the top end. INFRASTRUCTURE DEFICIT The IAF does not have a basic trainer aircraft on which to hone the skills of rookie pilots. The IAF is probably the only air force in the world that puts pilots directly on a jet rather then a turboprop basic trainer. Even the jet trainer is of a model from the 1970s. The Hawk aircraft have come a decade too late and the interim has caused loss of precious lives and compromised training. The MoD has belatedly approved the acquisition of the Swiss Pilatus trainer. Even if its procurement procedure goes forward, it will be five years before a fleet can be put in place. This is because acquiring the aircraft is only the beginning. Instructors have to be trained on the new aircraft and the equipment protocols put in place. Till such time, the safety record of the IAF is likely to suffer all the more. The IAF lost 46 fighters in the last six years. Alarmingly, the losses include not just aging MiG 21s, even ultra-modern SU 30s were lost. The IAF does not even have hangar facilities for majority of the SU 30s. This came to light when exposure to foreign elements was believed to be a cause in the last major crash of an SU 30. If basic infrastructure on the ground such as a hangar is unavailable in requisite numbers one can only imagine the state of more advance airworthiness procedures. Some years ago the IAF damaged half a dozen frontline Mirage 2000s in Gwalior when a hangar complex housing them collapsed apparently due to sub-standard construction. No lessons have been learned. The list of woes is endless — from Russian air-to-air missiles, that as a CAG report pointed, under-perform both in range and in accuracy during operations, to the fact that by the IAF’ s own admission there are major gaps in radar coverage across India. It is time that these matters were discussed in Parliament and the public domain, even as the Ministry of Defence mandarins pretend it is business as usual and bask in undeserved glory

Interview with George soros

'The challenge for democracy is to go beyond the vote' George Soros He has been famously called a 'moron' by former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Muhammed, and was criticised as 'an evil man' by the Thai government. This was in 1997, when the tiger economies of Southeast Asia went into a tailspin and those countries felt that speculators, led by the billionaire George Soros, had pulled out money leading to economic chaos that lasted years. But Soros is more than just a man with lots of money; he also has a mission — to promote democracy — for which he has pledged his own funds. He was in New Delhi last week to release a survey on the state of democracy in South Asia by the Center for the Study of Developing Societies. In a chat with Ninad D Sheth he declined to talk about his investment plans or the economy, preferring to stick to his great concern: the promotion of democracy. You have never been to India before, which is surprising. What is more interesting is that you have never invested here... India has always been of close interest to me. I had tried to invest here way back, as many as 15 years ago. However, at that time there were several restrictions. As for India as a democracy, we at the Open Society Institute watch it very closely, and I am here to learn first-hand about the magic of Indian democracy. Rest of South Asia has an uneven relationship with democracy… Yes. Two countries are of particular interest to me — Pakistan and Burma. Pakistan is obviously not a democracy. But many independent people have told me that there is more media freedom under Musharraf than there was under Nawaz Sharif. I find it perplexing that on the level of press freedom, electoral democracy in Pakistan has not been able to deliver. In Burma, on the other hand, there is a clear void, since elections are not allowed. It is a non-democratic and non-representative regime and I believe that it is critical to push for the democratic alternative in that country. I have a personal initiative in Burma and I spend considerable time and effort in watching the situation in that country closely. The last few years have seen democracy emerge in several countries. How has it evolved in your own lifetime? Well, it has obviously spread much wider now. However, its depth remains a problem. I also think that instead of aggregation of concerns of the voting public, a lot of the time the elected politicians are concerned only about their own good. This is a worrying development, more so since corruption and lack of governance are directly linked with what I see as a self-serving governing elite. The challenge for democracy is in its ability to get more accountability and better governance through more transparent institutions. Don't you think voters see through such elites and vote them out? Electoral democracy alone is very limited. While electoral processes are critical in setting the broader terms of discourse, they have limitations in ensuring good governance. It's important to broaden the democratic base to include checks and balances beyond the mandate of the ballot box, and to revive non-governmental institutions and vitalise alternatives beyond political parties. The challenge for democracy is to go beyond the vote. Open societies need constant vigil to maintain the openness — it cannot be taken for granted. What challenges does financial globalisation pose to democratic control and the nation state? The challenges posed by financial globalisation are not new. What has changed is the speed at which financial globalisation has gone ahead. I believe that the challenge for democracies is to build flexible institutions that can react to the pace of change. It is in that context that foreign policy in the financial sphere should look to regulation, from an international standpoint; this is particularly true for democracies that are also globalised markets. You have watched Russia closely. There are concerns that Moscow is increasingly turning towards totalitarianism… Yes, this is true. Putin has curbed a lot of institutions, including the power of opposition parties and the media. Moreover, he is in a very firm position — the Russian economy will remain in the growth mode for some time to come. Answers for Russian democracy, I believe, have to come from within Russia. Outside criticism only makes Putin stronger, as he can play the nationalist card and prey on old fears. But there is bound to be an impact on Eastern Europe and Russia's so-called 'near abroad'. It is too early to tell. One thing is certain though — Russia will use its newfound leverage, especially in commodities prices, and the Baltic states and Ukraine are obviously more vulnerable. However, other East European democracies are less influenced by Russia. For one thing, most are now in the NATO framework and therefore have institutional democratic support. Are you likely to open an institution in India on the lines of the Soros Foundation? I would like to, but I cannot. There are too many restrictions on foreign foundations in India. We do not feel that we will have the independence that we need to operate here. I am afraid Indian laws regarding foreign foundations are much too restrictive.

India's defense buying spree

It should not deter us that Wikileaks has failed so far to enliven Delhi’s parlour debate on what America makes of India’s military heft (or lack thereof). Apart from a stray mention of the lethargy with which India arms itself, there is nothing in the latest leaks to talk about. What should excite interest, however, are the hard facts that are India’s own—specifically, the $50 billion that New Delhi has lined up for defence purchases over this decade. It is a staggering sum of money, and could conceivably give Indian defence forces a bigger bang for the buck than it has obtained of late.

THE ORDER ROLL
So, what is on the shopping list? The big ticket items include spending Rs 42,000 crore on 124 next-generation fighter aircraft for the Indian Air Force, Rs 20,000 crore on six Scorpene submarines, and an additional Rs 12,000 crore on three submarines to be bought off the shelf and three more to be built in India. Plus, Rs 5,000 crore for 300 odd attack helicopters for the Air Force and Army, Rs 4,800 crore for C-130 airlift aircraft and Rs 8,000 crore for 10 strategic heavy lift aircraft. There are howitzers and the like as well.

Deployed well, all this firepower could reshape the way India defends itself in the foreseeable future. “The new hardware being acquired is partly because India has now more money to do so and partly because the mandate of its armed forces is being transformed,” according to Sunil Dasgupta, non-resident fellow at Brookings Institution, a US think-tank, and co-author of Arming Without Aiming, a new book on India’s arms acquisition strategy, “India’s hardware acquisition will have to come from a proper identification of threats, and then [India must adapt] the weapons to changes in threat perception.”

Changes, of course, are ongoing. In fact, there are four main trends that are shaping India’s armoury.

HIMALAYAN THREATS
The Indian defence budget has long been dominated by the Army. However, over the next decade the Air Force will emerge as a key strategic force. This is a critical change. The manpower-heavy Army can prove pivotal on the ground, but a nuclear strike capability involves air delivery—with back-up aircraft. This explains the 124 new fighter aircraft and opening of half a dozen air bases along the Himalayas, from Arunachal to Ladakh. The Air Force has already deployed new Su-30MKI aircraft in the western theatre, but more firepower is needed.

The long Chinese border is expected to come increasingly into focus. On the ground, the Army is raising two new mountain divisions and a mountain brigade. That’s 40,000 extra soldiers. It is partly to assist this force that the new C-130s and C-17 heavy lift aircraft will be employed. Ultra-light FH-177 howitzers will also be for high-altitude use.

THE SHIFT TO AMERICAN ARMS
From artillery-locating radars and long-range P8I spy aircraft for the Navy, to the 124 new fighters and heavy-lift planes, suddenly the US looms large on India’s purchase list (though there are five other suppliers vying for the fighter deal). This is a clear break from the past, when Russia accounted for at least 70 per cent of India’s hardware supplies. American equipment is costlier upfront even if it takes less money to maintain, but India has weightier issues to ponder right now.

The US, for a start, is not making it easy for India with its insistence on intrusive inspection regimes and zest for live-wire information synchrony. Even US President Obama’s recent visit could not overcome this hurdle. India is resisting two arrangements proposed by the US. The first of these is the Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA); and the second is the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) for geo-spatial cooperation. These are sticking points, as they effectively force India and the US into a closer alliance.

“The US has a reliability problem in India. The perception is that the US could be difficult in the long run where supply of weapons is concerned,” as Dasgupta sums up, “On the other hand, India wants a strategic relationship with the US that emphasises common values. The defence deals will be an important component of such an overall relationship.”

THE OFFSET CLAUSE
India’s new defence purchase policy, due in early 2011, is expected to formalise the so-called defence offset clause in arms purchase deals. Designed to nurture a domestic arms industry, it stipulates that contracts worth at least 30 per cent of any deal’s value be awarded back to Indian suppliers of parts, software and so on. The Tata Group already has some joint ventures with foreign firms to develop relevant equipment, and the Mahindra Group is in the field as well.

According to a report by Research and Markets, a consultancy, the offset clause opens up a market worth more than $14 billion over the next decade. Software supplies alone could yield about $2 billion a year in export earnings for Indian companies straightaway.

“The offset clause will allow Indian firms, especially in the private sector, to play a bigger role in the defence business,” says Anit Mukherjee of Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), an Indian think-tank, “However, for an indigenous capability in arms, the real way forward is to make the public sector more competitive and accountable, without which we will remain an arms importer for a long time to come.”

JOINT DEVELOPMENT
Increasingly, international partnerships will play a role in the way India arms itself. On the joint development of weapon systems, India is well on its way with three mega projects. The first aims to develop a fifth-generation fighter bomber jointly with Russia (a test flight was conducted in January 2010), which is expected to signal a leap in technical sophistication. The second is BrahMos, a supersonic cruise missile developed by DRDO jointly with Russia. The third is an effort with Israel to develop next-generation anti-aircraft missiles.

SELF-SUFFICIENCY
Foreign purchases often have their own problems. Remember the celebration two years ago that greeted the Navy’s acquisition of an amphibious troop carrier, USS Trenton, from the US? The rickety old ship (first commissioned in 1970) was touted as the Navy’s second-largest vessel, renamed INS Jalashwa. But just a few months into its deployment, it sprouted a hydrogen sulphide gas leak during an exercise in the Bay of Bengal, killing five sailors on the spot.
Money, evidently, is not all one needs to transform a military force. One needs a coherent strategy to make the most of the weapons at one’s disposal. The induction of foreign military hardware, for example, requires a proper timeframe within which integration must take place—with enough to fill the gaps in the interim. And this has to be done within the context of a clear purpose in the form of a military doctrine, which places each weapon system in one or many simulated theatres of war, as it were, in relation to specific threats.

On all these counts, India appears to be falling short. “The higher defence organisational set-up in India continues to exhibit serious weaknesses in its ability to prosecute wars in the contemporary strategic context,” says Harsh V Pant of the Centre for War Studies at London’s King’s College. In other words, even as India faces stiffer threats than ever before, its defence readiness has seen a dramatic decline. “Doctrinal evolution in my opinion is more important,” notes Pant, “India’s ‘Cold Start’ doctrine is an attempt to fight limited wars, under the nuclear shadow, with two enemies at the same time. The political establishment remains coy about accepting it, even starting a debate on it. But without some kind of doctrinal evolution, India, for all its acquisitions, will remain a second-rate military power.”

All the action, for now, seems to be focused on extra metal. “There is a whole range of requirements that are needed to augment India’s defence preparedness on an immediate basis,” says a senior Defence Ministry official, “The Air Force has a sanctioned strength of 39 squadrons, but currently has only 33, nearly half of which are antiquated MiG-21s and MiG-27s. The Army has not added a single howitzer gun since 1986, when Bofors guns were purchased, and needs 1,400 such pieces. The Navy’s submarine fleet has been reduced to only half a dozen subs that can be in service at any time. There are also big gaps in radars, small arms and attack helicopters, as well as heavy lift capabilities.”

Be it ammunition or aircraft, submarines or helicopters, field guns or hand guns, the message from New Delhi to the world is clear: India has no technology of its own to make such weapons. Bluntly speaking, this is a severe indictment of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), which can count being taken off a US blacklist as its biggest solo achievement, edging out Leh Berry, a high-altitude fruit pulp that it has to show for its multi-crore R&D efforts, something that has not exactly sent shivers down enemy spines.

The reason that DRDO has been a washout is a peculiar conflict-of-interest it has been saddled with. The boss of DRDO is also the chief scientific advisor to the Prime Minister—not only is he in charge of developing weapons, he also has the job of evaluating the same. In any other country, this would be a scandal. But in India, it is a budget booster for an overseas shopping spree.

The country’s sudden rush to acquire expensive weapons has another reason: making up for lost time. Under Defence Minister AK Antony’s watch, a kind of procurement paralysis had set in, with defence insiders joking that the Centre’s grand defence strategy was to defend his hard-won reputation for integrity. In the interests of transparency in defence deals, he banned middlemen.

Then reality struck; defence deals globally almost always involve intermediaries. So the Defence Minister did the next best thing. If he could not control graft, he could ensure there was no space for it—easily done by okaying no decision on any defence deal.

Another delay factor, some surmise, has been on account of the Indian Government’s new offset policy, which has been many years in the making; in this view, local companies needed time to get their act together.

And time has been running out. India’s 2010-11 defence budget is $31 billion. Even after accounting for routine expenses (salaries and so forth), there is plenty for capital expenditure on arms. Yet, so far, the latter part has gone unspent. This is how it has been for several years. Between 2000 and 2007, for example, an estimate says that the Ministry of Defence returned about $5 billion of unspent funds to the exchequer. Of any other ministry, such thrift would be admirable. But the world is a tough place, and the threats that India faces do not make any allowances for military modesty.

No wonder India is suddenly set to become the world’s biggest importer of arms, as noted by Sipri, the Stockholm-based research institute that tracks arms sales. India imports a huge 70 per cent of its weapons. It’s possible to justify this in terms of trade theory: export what you’re good at, import what they’re good at. But in the world of geopolitics, that’s a naïve way to analyse the scenario. Defence dependency, in fact, is the measure to watch. And had it not been for India’s nuclear cover, India’s overall dependency would have risen sharply. In terms of conventional warfare (under the ‘Cold Start’ doctrine), it certainly has.

Indigenous R&D could change that. Once private ventures acquire technical expertise, expect a series of new breakthroughs. Co-development beats off-the-shelf purchases. One gains not just defence independence, but also a set of patents and spin-offs that can be useful in other sectors such as software (the US experience validates this point). In the end, that is what counts, not the billions lined up to buy weapons.

Ak47- the king and I

A chill ran down my spine, and it wasn’t just the biting cold of the mountain desert at Kumbitam, Ladakh. I was frightened and thrilled at the same time. You would be too, if you held death itself in your hands. I was about to fire another burst of rounds from the greatest piece of machinery ever invented by man in my opinion. The AK-47.

I follow instructions, load the cartridge of 30 bullets, take aim, unlock the safety catch, and fire. All this in less than 15 seconds. I was aware of the infinite lightness of this beast—whose burden is to kill. For a gun that can fire 600 rounds of 5.44 mm chambered steel-cased ammunition per minute, it weighs only a little more than 4 kg, about as much as a child’s school bag.

There is something strangely uplifting about this weapon. One feels free, liberated by the rawness of its touch and reassurance of its reputation. As I continue firing some of the 150 odd rounds I fired that day at the 8th Mountain Division of the Indian Army, the bullets whizz away at the rate of 780 metres per second, which is the AK-47’s average muzzle velocity.

Down the decades, its trademark rat-a-tat-a-tat sound has reverberated through thousands of conflict zones across the world. From the killing fields of Vietnam to the icy heights of Kargil, from the gang wars of Mexico to the death zones of Iraq and Afghanistan, on to the bad streets as darkness falls over Johannesburg. That rattle brings with it death or a terrible wound—it can also be a harbinger of victory.

In the high mountainous corners of desolate Ladakh, this gun generates a sort of resonance that cannot be described, only dreaded.

The AK-47 is at once a forbidding firearm and a piece of art. One instant the peacekeeper, the very next the instrument of terrorists’ carnage. At once, friend and foe. A darling of special forces of the State and beloved by revolutionaries from Mozambique to the Hezbollah (both have it on their flags) keen on its overthrow. This is a gun with multiple personalities enough to fill an entire psychiatric ward.

Make no mistake, the Avotomat Kalashnikova 47 is the world’s greatest assault weapon. It was conceived in 1942 in the midst of World War II. German forces were running the Soviet Union over, 1,500 miles had been conquered by the Wehrmacht, 7 million Soviet citizens lay dead. The assault rifle was already a German invention, splattering blood relentlessly on the Steppes. It was then, during the savage siege of Stalingrad that would eventually destroy the German 6th Army and with it Hitler’s ambition, and cost at least 350,000 Soviet and 400,000 German lives, that work began on the rifle that was to attain iconic status.

Mikhail Kalashnikov, the man who designed this magnificent firearm, was hurt in battle and was recouping in hospital; born in 1919, the year of Amritsar’s Jalianwalla Bagh massacre (thankfully, the gun came many years after Dyer), Mikhail was one of 18 children his mum bore. In this hospital, as he later recounted in interviews, he was encouraged by a fellow wounded soldier to develop an automatic rifle to rival what German soldiers had.

Kalashnikov, being a perfectionist, developed one better. He put brains and skills together and came up with the gun that even today, some 60 or more years on, remains the weapon of choice the world over. So successful has it been that more than 90 million pieces of this gun have been manufactured, since. The AK-47 has been used in at least 120 countries worldwide.

What is even more amazing is that in the technologically fast changing world of firepower, over half a century of the AK-47 has seen only two modifications, and that too, so minor you wouldn’t even notice. The first was when Chinese designers developed the AK-56 (in 1956), which differs slightly in its fully hooded sights in contrast with the original AK-47’s partially enclosed one. Some even consider this copycat version poorer since it lacks a threaded muzzle that gives the AK-47 its trademark soft recoil.

The other attempt at upgradation was by Soviet engineers, who developed the AK-74 (in 1974). Again, this had new bullets, but while more accurate, their killing capacity couldn’t match that of the old bullets. The original old killers have a way of producing what science terms ‘hydrostatic shock’. Once on target, each bullet pierces its way in and fragments into body tissue, making it almost impossible to treat. The new guns create much cleaner wounds.

What is more, given that the AK-47 gun can shoot 600 rounds a minute, it has turned target accuracy a mere matter of academic interest rather than operational performance.

Mikhail Kalashnikov is still alive. He has only two regrets. One, that the gun, though perfect, took so long to develop. It entered service with the Red Army only after the end of the War—in 1947. By then, the Soviet Union had made a dead mouse of the Nazi Hitler in his bunker, and an iron curtain was being drawn across Europe. The gun’s debut, thus, was in the clasp of an iron fist.

The Soviet Union lost nearly 20 million to the War which killed 5 million Germans. Had the gun come earlier, Soviet Russia could have suffered far fewer casualties, and perhaps even have ended hostilities sooner. This remains one of the intriguing what-ifs of world history.

Kalashnikov’s second regret is the sheer number of people his gun has killed and wounded. In an act of supreme irony, the man who designed this gun has now set up a fund for gunshot victims.

On that cold day, as we finished our test-firing of the AK-47 in Ladakh, I felt a strange numbness which overcame the uplifting sensation of freedom or even exhilaration that I had experienced just a moment earlier.

Next to me, firing away was a fellow journalist, Muzzamil Butt, working for Sahara, a TV channel. Later at the mess, as we finished our third round of Old Monk, both drinking at a slightly faster pace than we were accustomed to, I asked him how he felt. His answer was startling: “I have overcome fear. It’s the end of my nightmares—this gun began it, and now after firing it, has set me free.” Muzzamil had once been shot covering a protest in Srinagar; the bullet had come through the barrel of an AK-47. He has lived to tell and win his personal battle.